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N RECENT years, the function of psychiatrists, neurologists and
psychologists in personal injury cases has become so extensive
that attorneys working in this area need a wide acquaintance with
new medico-legal viewpoints. Medical aspects of negligence mat-
ters involve not only an exact description of the injuries sustained by
the client, but also a consideration of the vital subjects of causation
and prognosis. In addition to his diagnostic and prognostic evalua-
tion, the medical expert is often asked his opinion as to the proximate
cause of a plaintiff's injuries.
In complex cases, the extent of physical, mental and emotional dis-
abilities and their impact on the plaintiff's personality and life pattern
become important. Thus, the psychiatric expert may be called upon
to supply specific information and carefully considered opinions on
all phases of the plaintiff's life.
This article will describe some of the major types of traumatically
induced injuries which have a psychological impact on the patient
and which are important considerations in seeking recovery. Illus-
trations from published case material will be used, as well as clin-
ical cases from the files of one of the authors (W.B.) and court deci-
sions ruling on the compensability of certain types of injuries (e.g.,
impact v. non-impact emotional shock), but the major emphasis will
be given to the medical and psychological sequelae of common per-
sonal injury cases.
t This article is excerpted from a chapter of a forthcoming work by the authors
entitled CURRENT ISSUES IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW.
* DR. BROMBERO, M.D., L.F., A.P.A., is Adjunct Professor of Legal Medicine at
University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, California.
** DR. BRODY, Ph. D., J.D., is Assistant Dean and Associate Professor of Law
at University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, California.
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THE MEDICAL SPECIALISTS
Medical problems in negligence cases involve many types of spe-
cialists. It is important for the attorney to know what the functions
of these individuals are, so that he may use these experts' skills most
effectively, saving time and expense for himself and his client.
An attorney handling a personal injury case may find his client
requiring the services of an ophthalmologist (specialist in diseases of
the eye), orthopedic surgeon (specialist in bone and joint injuries and
diseases), otolaryngologist (specialist in diseases of the ear and
larynx), or a number of other medical specialists. However, our
discussion below will be limited to those most directly involved in
diagnosing and treating emotional problems of the injured plaintiff.
The functions of the various specialists in these areas are as fol-
lows: The neurologist handles disorders of the brain, spinal cord
and peripheral nerves. The neurosurgeon performs similar services,
but deals mainly with surgical correction of brain and spinal cord
injuries. A psychiatrist handles problems of intellectual dysfunction,
emotional disturbances and social deviancy. The psychoanalyst is
usually a psychiatrist who has received additional training in the
therapeutic techniques of Freud or one of his disciples; he is not
often involved in negligence cases, but may be called upon where
issues of emotional trauma or distress are involved. The psychologist
is not medically trained, but studied instead in a university graduate
department of psychology where he earned, in most cases, the Ph.D.
degree. He may become involved as an expert where, for example,
issues of impaired intelligence due to brain injury require a precise
evaluation of plaintiff's intelligence level, or where personality
changes in the plaintiff call for the administration and clinical inter-
pretation of various projective techniques such as the Rorschach,
TAT, or Draw-a-Person test.
The specialists described above operate from varying theoretical
orientations and professional attitudes. Hence, it is important for
the attorney to recognize that the physician's own psychological atti-
tudes in cases involving emotional and nervous disabilities may un-
wittingly, or even consciously, invade his final judgment as to diag-
nosis, causation or prognosis. In general, it can be said that the
neurologist's perspective is in the direction of organicity, i.e., demon-
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strable signs of nervous system injury or disease. The neuro-sur-
geon is interested more in objective signs of pathology and less in
subjective complaints. The psychiatrist's training gives him a human-
istic bias toward the patient. His viewpoint includes social, cultural,
economic and organic (i.e., neurologic) understanding, as well as the
problems of personality. Moreover, the psychiatrist, especially one
with pyschoanalytic training, relates his observations to his knowledge
of unconscious motives and emotions, such as dependency, hostility,
psycho-sexual tendencies, etc.
In discussing the physician's attitude towards his patient, it is im-
portant to note that he may become involved in what is called "coun-
ter-transference." Just as the patient has a transference on an un-
conscious level from older figures in his environment to his doctor,
so the doctor (or the lawyer) may have feelings arising toward his
patient (or client) from his own unconscious needs. The doctor,
thus, may have an inclination to be the saviour or supporter of emo-
tionally dependent individuals or a severe critic thereof. These atti-
tudes are calibrated within the psychiatrist, if he knows himself, in
evaluating a patient's reactions to injury. The psychiatrist should
understand not only the conscious material presented to him, but also
the basic, unconscious attitudes underlying the patient's complaints.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF NERVOUS SYSTEM INJURIES
The attorney will find that both physical and emotional injuries
are involved in many personal injury cases. Often, the overlap be-
tween the two makes it difficult to distinguish which complaints are
somatically induced and which are psychologically based. However,
insofar as it is possible to make a distinction between the two, we
shall attempt to do so. Furthermore, while emotional problems can
develop from injuries (or near-injuries) to any part of the body, we
shall generally limit our discussion to injuries to the central nervous
system.
PHYSICALLY-INDUCED NERVOUS SYSTEM INJURIES
The most obvious types of nervous system injuries are skull frac-
tures, brain concussion (with its subsequent postconcussive state),
spinal cord damage and peripheral nerve injury. Other common brain
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syndromes include sub-dural or extra-dural hematomas (blood clots),
hemorrhages in various areas of the brain, lacerations of brain tissue,
and the often denied, but still valid, "neurosis after trauma," or
"traumatic neurosis" as it is sometimes called. This last syndrome
will be discussed under the section dealing with traumatically-induced
mental disorders.
The classification of various mental and physical states following
head injury is not entirely agreed upon by all authorities. That
classification used by the neurologist and neuro-surgeon differs in
some respects from that of neuro-psychiatrists and psychiatrists,
chiefly for the reason that the latter are more concerned with the re-
mote mental and emotional effects of such injuries.
The neurologist and neuro-surgeon usually classify head injuries
on the basis of pathology as: (1) closed head injuries, including
simple concussion, cerebral edema, contusion, and laceration; (2)
depressed fracture; and (3) compound fracture. These injuries are
further described as follows: (1) closed head injuries-where the
injury is not sufficiently serious to open the skull casing, although
there may be a linear fracture; these include: (a) simple concussion
-the brain encased within the skull receives a "bump" following a
blow to the head. There is a momentary stunning effect and possible
transitory headache lasting from a few hours to a day; (b) cerebral
edema-swelling of the brain tissues, the amount depending upon
the degree of injury; (c) contusion-a bruise of the brain tissue itself
or the membranes covering the brain (dura mater, arachnoid, pia
mater); (d) laceration-a tearing of the brain tissue or surrounding
membranes; (2) depressed skull fracture-where a piece of bone
is driven into the brain and its coverings; (3) compound skull frac-
ture-where the scalp is broken by a bone fragment.
Corrective surgery is usually required in cases of depressed or com-
pound skull fracture. Any head injury, whether or not accom-
panied by a fracture, can result in confusion, delirium, coma, or even
death, depending on the area of the brain affected and the severity
of the blow. Should bleeding occur in the brain tissue, paralysis or
other symptoms may occur. When the acute symptoms subside
and the patient recovers his consciousness and awareness, he is left
with the specific symptoms of headache, dizziness, visual troubles,
etc. After the acute phase has passed (in six months generally) and
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symptoms still persist, the patient may be said to be suffering from a
chronic brain syndrome, indicating the brain damage may be irre-
versible.
Since the after-effects of head injuries often fall to the psychiatrists
or neurologists, their concern with mental or behavioral reactions to
trauma is naturally greater. Although workers in this field are not
unanimous, the following classification represents a practical over-
view of the wide range of sequelae of head traumas. Hence, the fol-
lowing classification is chiefly on the basis of reactions in the patient:
(1) Acute brain syndromes: (a) simple concussion; (b) major
concussion; (c) post-concussion syndrome; (d) traumatic coma; (e)
traumatic delirium; (f) Korsakoff's syndrome (very uncommon).
(2) Chronic brain syndromes: (a) with neurotic reaction; (b)
with psychotic reaction; (c) with behavioral reaction (personality
deterioration); (d) post-concussion syndrome.
(3) Secondary traumatic mental disorders: (a) "terror" or
"traumatic" neuroses; (b) secondary psychoneuroses, including anx-
iety states and hysteria; (c) "compensation" neuroses.
(4) Functional psychoses (e.g., schizophrenia, affective psycho-
ses, i.e., manic-depressive states).
(5) Malingering.
We shall now briefly describe some of the more important of the
conditions listed above.
Acute Brain Syndromes
The acute brain syndromes are distinguished from chronic brain
syndromes by the relatively transitory nature of the symptoms. In-
jury to the brain is considered reversible in these syndromes and the
after-effects of the trauma ordinarily do not persist beyond three to
six months.
In simple concussion there is a stunning or momentary loss of con-
sciousness following a blow to the head. The patient has an aware-
ness of what has happened; therefore, he claims no amnesias or similar
effects. A mild, transitory headache may follow.
A major concussion may follow a blow to the head, explosion, or
whiplash accident. The patient commonly, though not always, is
[Vol. XXI: 28
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rendered unconscious for a period of from five minutes to one hour.
There may be amnesia for the events just prior to and following the
injury. This loss of memory may last for as little as one hour to as
long as one or two days. As the patient returns to awareness, he be-
gins to describe headache, dizziness, and other symptoms. If the
injury is more serious than described above, the patient may expe-
rience prolonged unconsciousness (coma), delirium, or Korsakoff's
syndrome. The latter is a sustained period of defective memory with
the patient fabricating to fill in the gaps. It is rather uncommon.
Hardin describes the clinical picture of concussion succinctly:
About one-half of the patients suffering concussion will recover within a few days,
while the remainder will show the sequelae generally called "postconcussion syn-
drome."
The picture produced by a serious brain injury regularly follows the pattern of
recovery outlined by Schilder and Symonds: coma, followed by stupor (deep clouding
of consciousness with general restiveness), delirium (moderate clouding of con-
sciousness with disorientation, bewilderment and helplessness), eventuating in a state
of Korsakoff's psychosis before recovery.'
At this point, it might also be well to point out that, in addition to
a direct blow to the head, two other forms of injury may cause a con-
cussion. These are the contra-coup concussion and the cranio-cervi-
cal syndrome, more commonly known as whiplash.
A contra-coup concussion is one which results in injury to the op-
posite side of the brain from that which was struck. For example, if
a blow occurs to the right temporal area of the head, the left tem-
poral lobe of the brain might strike the internal surface of the skull.
Since the skull is a rigid structure, whereas the brain and its sur-
rounding membranes are relatively soft, the brain may be "slapped,"
so to speak, against the irregular, internal outline of the opposite
(left) side of the skull. In these cases, a shearing effect can result as
the blow is transmitted to the membranes, blood vessels, or cranial
nerves exiting from the brain to the sense organs such as the eyes,
ears, and nose inducing specific sensory symptoms as blurred vision,
tinnitus, etc.
In the whiplash injury, the head is held back momentarily due to
inertia, then snapped forward and backward one or more times.
The supporting neck muscles are strained severely, but more sig-
1. HmwN & COLE, DISEASE AND INJURY 25-26 (1961).
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nificantly, the brain is "whiplashed" causing a brain concussion
within the skull without the head having been struck.
This type of concussion is more common in rear-end auto crashes
than is generally acknowledged, even when the driver or passenger
was using seat belts. Experimental studies with rhesus monkeys have
demonstrated that cerebral concussion, as well as gross hemorrhages
and contusions over the surface of the brain, can be produced through
whiplash action of the head on the neck alone, without direct impact
to the head. 2
Returning now to the symptoms of concussion, the characteristic
signs usually appear within one to five days. The patient experiences
a band-like headache, intermittent in character. He may also suffer
from any of the following: irritability, lack of ability to concentrate,
poor memory, sensitivity to light, watering of the eyes, sensitivity to
noises, ringing in the ears, fatigue, loss of appetite, nausea, dizziness
(either constant or in sporadic black-outs) and depression with crying
spells.
The post-concussion syndrome is of special interest to the attorney
because of the large number of claims for recovery from auto acci-
dent-related injuries found here. Post-concussion syndrome may be
either acute or chronic depending on the length of time the patient
is likely to be afflicted with the symptoms. The syndrome may last
anywhere from three months to five years, in varying degrees.
As the late effects of concussion merge into a post-concussion syn-
drome, factors of a psychological nature, other than the actual impact,
come into play. The personality of the injured party has much to do
with the later clinical picture. As will be noticed, the post-concussion
syndrome is similar to the symptoms of neurosis after trauma, (trau-
matic neurosis) to be discussed later.
Two cases of post-concussion syndrome will now be described. In
the first case, a young man of eighteen, with no previous illness of any
kind, was injured in a California auto accident. In the second, a fifty-
four year-old man was injured in New York. Prior to this accident,
his larynx had been removed due to cancer.
Clinical Case #1. Mr. Gomes, aged eighteen, was involved in a rear-end auto
2. Ommoya, Foas, and Yarnell, Whiplash Injury and Brain Damage, 204
J.A.M.A. 75 (1968).
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accident. On February 14, 1968, the car which he was driving apparently over-
turned. The patient was aware only of a sensation of falling and did not remember
whether he struck any part of the car. When the car came to rest, he felt nauseous
and had pain in the right side of the head from a laceration. He was treated
at the hospital that day. X rays of the skull were negative.
Following the accident, the patient suffered dizziness, especially when he rose
from a sitting or lying position. It occurred several times a day, without warning.
At times it almost amounted to a "blackout" in which his vision blurred to the
point where he could not see. Dizziness cleared up in a few seconds ordinarily.
In addition, the patient suffered headaches (frontal in nature) lasting for a day to
a month, and nausea. The patient felt "butterflies in his stomach" and had
a general feeling of tension which was not present before. He said he was
"leery" and "didn't trust it," meaning that he was worried lest the dizziness and
blackout spells come when he was in a vulnerable position. He did not
feel "sure" of himself.
The course of the symptoms during the following year followed the usual progress
of this type of head injury. More than a year after the accident the patient
still suffered from occasional dizzy spells and headaches, and often vomited (dry
heaves) in the morning.
Two years later, the patient showed improvement as prognosticated. Headaches
no longer present: nausea reduced but dizziness occurred about once a week. When
he got up quickly, he would black out for a few seconds.
Clinical Case #2. On November 7, 1965, Mr. White was a passenger in a car
which was struck broadside. He was aware of having heard the impact, then he saw
blood streaming down his face and remembered little until he found himself in the
hospital being treated by a surgeon. He estimated that he was unconscious or semi-
conscious for about fifteen minutes. He had pain over the forehead, over the right
eye, in the right knee and in the back.
The patient complained of: headaches, frontal in type, occurring approximately
four times a week and lasting several hours; vertigo, in the morning especially, lasting
about five minutes but occurring for briefer periods throughout the day; pain
in the neck on the right, especially when turning; pain in the lower back; restless
sleep with periods of awakening drenched in perspiration; and nervousness and ten-
sion, especially in crowds and crossing the street.
Mental examination showed that the patient was unusually stoical and tended to
minimize his symptoms, except for the headache and vertigo. For example, he did
not recognize that his episodes of perspiration at night represented nightmares
typical of post-traumatic shock.
Not infrequently, one finds a prior history branding such persons
as accident-prone, at least from the standpoint of the defendant in-
surance carriers. There may be psychological reasons why these
individuals are involved in multiple accidents, or it may be pure
coincidence. A thorough history is all-important in weeding out the
various psychological factors operative in a given case. In any event,
the effect on the resulting symptoms is noticeable.
In the following case, a young man suffered a brain concussion
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI:28
with unconsciousness, a convulsive seizure at the time of impact and
a positive EEG soon after. The post-concussive syndrome was clear,
but this clinical picture took on some features of an hysterical neu-
rosis.
Clinical Case #3. The patient was twenty years old. There was a prior history
of injury following an automobile accident on December 24, 1965. He was a
passenger at that time. The symptoms were right frontal headaches, trance-like
states and "violent behavior," which led to his transfer to a psychiatric hospital.
In January of 1966, he suffered a second auto accident accompanied by minor
head symptoms. On March 5, 1966, in a third accident, the patient's car was struck
from the rear. Immediately thereafter he felt pain in the right side, had a feeling
of "flying" and passed out. He woke up in a general hospital where he remained
for about nine days. An epileptic fit of some type occurred during this period. The
X rays of the skull were negative but the electroencephalogram was reported
as "mild to moderate abnormality" without focal signs and with "scattered 5-7
slow waves."
Following this latest accident the patient complained of feelings of light-headed-
ness, dizziness, fainting spells with tremor during which he was partially aware of
his surroundings but could not talk or place the conversation he heard. He had
one such spell in 1966 and two or three in 1967. He also complained of
blurred vision, loss of weight (twelve pounds) and nervousness. During his two
hospitalizations, he was observed in two episodes of "spastic shaking with tremors
of legs."
The examiners felt that basically they were dealing with a neurotic youth in whom
evidences of cerebral concussion were intensified. The tremors of legs were consid-
ered hysterical in nature.
Hysterical or other psychological reactions following concussion
occur with special vividness among children and adolescents. The
following clinical case demonstrates this situation:
Clinical Case #4. A boy of 13, a pupil in the sixth grade of elementary school,
from a bi-lingual home, was struck by a motor vehicle, his head hitting the pave-
ment. Although the question of unconsciousness was not clearly settled, it appeared
that the patient was stunned but not unconscious. He remembered the policeman
who helped him and was able to get up and walk just after the accident.
The presenting symptoms were dizziness and inability to walk, difficulty in moving
head due to stiff neck, and difficulty in seeing, described as a blinking spasm. In
the ensuing weeks the patient suffered from other symptoms as follows: insomnia
with restlessness and talking in his sleep, somnambulism, bed-wetting, a complaining
attitude, fatigue, complaints of body-pain and decrease in efficiency in school work.
During the mental examination he was quite uncommunicative. His answers were
given slowly. With encouragement, the patient talked more freely as the interview
progressed. The initial impression of mental dullness changed as the interview
progressed. His mood was generally inhibited and retarded but he complied with
spoken instructions from the examiner. The general phobic attitude could be re-
duced by dealing realistically with the boy. With casual conversation and a relaxed
attitude, the patient lost some of his slowness and fearfulness. The personality
change described by the father, this obtuseness, apparent dullness and withdrawn
attitude, was quickly dissolved by a "therapeutic attitude."
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It was concluded, therefore, that there was no permanent personality change mani-
fested in this boy, but a reaction of fearfulness (technically known as a psychological
regression), which gave the impression of permanent personality change. This
amounted to a traumatic neurosis following concussion.
The following case illustrates some of the other psychological com-
plexities which may accompany head injuries, accentuating or dis-
torting the symptoms of concussion:
Clinical Case #5. The patient, a married woman of twenty-six, was always well
and physically vigorous until November, 1965, when she became involved in a motor
car accident. She had married at the age of nineteen, had two children, the older
of whom was involved in the same accident. There were no previous operations or
major illnesses.
In November, 1965, while in her car at a stop light, sitting in the driver's seat,
she felt an impact from behind and felt the car pushed forward until it struck
another car; she felt herself being rocked back and forth, striking her face on the
dashboard. Her four-year old son, sitting immediately behind her, struck the seat-
back and sustained a fractured skull. After the moment of impact, the patient
was aware of her bleeding nose and of her own hysterical screaming as she thought
her unconscious son, who was bleeding from the ear and crushed beneath the seat-
back, was dead, The patient and son were removed to a hospital where both were
X rayed and examined.
Because of her extreme apprehension regarding her son, she was actually unaware
of her own symptoms until about a month after the accident. Then the patient
began to suffer from headaches in the back of the head, tension or excitement which
lasted all day, nervousness, irritability, jittery sensations in her abdomen, depression
and restlessness, inability to sleep with a feeling of being unable to accomplish her
work or concentrate, burning of the eyes, pain in the mid-back, and sudden sharp
pains moving up the back to the shoulders, neck and vertex of the head, then down
to the buttocks. At these times her head was motionless and she was almost in-
capacitated from any movement of the neck and back muscles. This lasted about
a week or ten days and subsided under medication. There was also numbness of
the back and abdominal area, especially when sleeping, and some numbness of the
toes, phobias when in a car or crossing the street, occasional dizziness, and decrease
in sexual libido.
Examination showed only moderate tenderness over the posterior neck muscles but
no specific tenderness of spinous processes or paravertebral muscles. All movements
of the trunk and extremities were performed within normal limits.
This patient had suffered a definite whiplash injury. Because of
the serious injury to her four-year old son, however, she repressed her
own symptoms until he was out of danger-then the full flood of
symptoms assailed her. This reaction is classic for whiplash victims.
The symptoms of concussion and post-concussion, enumerated
above, occur in a pattern that deviates only slightly from case to case,
although not necessarily represented fully in each patient. Con-
versely, patients who start with a full gamut of complaints, may lose
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some of them gradually even though headache, dizziness, and nervous
tension may persist for years.
The degree of unconsciousness immediately following the accident
apparently bears little relation to post-concussive symptoms. Neither
do the patient's age, previous personality make-up, cultural back-
ground or other geographic or social factors. This remarkable spec-
ificity of symptoms can be related to the pathology of concussion
(minute hemorrhagic areas in the brain tissue, contusion of tissues
etc.). One proof of this can be seen in brain concussion cases accom-
panied by changes in the electroencephalographic waves, i.e., slow
waves between four and seven per second. During the first three
months after the initial concussion sixty-three percent of post-con-
cussion cases show these positive brain wave tracings. After two
years, thirty-eight percent continue to show changes in EEG pat-
terns.,
Unlike the physical symptoms, however, neurotic complications fol-
lowing the original concussion do relate to the personality make-up
of the patient, a situation which often renders expert judgment diffi-
cult.
Although the acute brain trauma and the chronic brain trauma are
classified separately here, in reality they often merge. Furthermore,
it is often difficult to differentiate organic from mental sequelae, and
the separation of neuro-surgical from neuro-psychiatric cases or pri-
mary vs. secondary brain trauma syndromes. The following case will
illustrate how the organic and psychological factors intertwine:
Clinical Case #6. A woman of thirty-four was admitted to the hospital on August
2, 1965, following an automobile accident. The patient on admission was found to
be suffering from a cerebral concussion, a contusion of the brain with an aphasia
(difficulty in speaking), a temporary paralysis of the right side of the body and
extensive lacerations of the face.
The patient, a passenger sitting next to the door, was injured when a tractor-trailer
made a u-turn in front of the car. As a result of the impact, the seat moved forward,
the engine was pushed back, and the roof of the car caved in. She sustained a head
injury, injuries to both legs, the left hand and right arm.
An electroencephalogram performed ten days after admission indicated a moderate
amount of 4-6 cycle per second slow wave activity, with an occasional paroxysmal
sharp wave accentuation, indicating abnormality. The official diagnosis was cere-
bral concussion, contusion of the brain with an aphasia and a temporary right hemi-
paresis and many lacerations of the face, head, hands, arms and legs.
3. CURRAN, LAW AND MEDICINE 266 (1960).
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The past history was negative. Following hospitalization, the patient began to be
aware of the following symptoms: headache, some dizziness, tearing and burning
eyes with blurring of vision, insomnia, poor appetite, nervousness, irritability, de-
pression and memory loss. In addition, there were pains in the neck, shoulder, and
knee, especially on the right side, numbness of the hands and pain in the low back.
The final diagnosis: brain laceration in the left frontal-temporal lobe of the brain
in addition brain concussion and multiple lacerations. The evidence of brain injury
was the unconsciousness, aphasia, right-sided reflex and motor signs. The concus-
sive symptoms were headache, dizziness, blurred vision, insomnia, nervousness,
memory loss, etc. Her husband confirmed the fact that she was depressed, tense,
irritable, and sometimes confused. The mental state was characterized by dullness,
some traces of aphasia, restricted interests and difficulty in concentration.
The significant point of this case was the demonstrable pathology
in the brain. More often it is not so apparent; yet, the patient suffers
just as severely as if hemorrhage in the brain, neurologic signs of
motor dysfunction or a positive EEG test were present. Moreover,
a negative EEG early in the case does not disprove an injury to the
brain. In fact, in the ordinary concussion case, the brain wave test
is of minor significance. It is also noteworthy that many children
frequently show abnormal EEG's without a history of head trauma.
The significance of unconsciousness in terms of the resulting clin-
ical picture also requires comment. It is generally stated that the
duration of the unconscious period coincides roughly with the amount
of tissue injury. This is true for major degrees of brain injury. Thus,
a prolonged coma usually means a serious injury and hence corre-
lates with prolonged symptomatology and disability. But, a brief pe-
riod of unconsciousness (from a few minutes to a half-hour) may
also result in persistent disabling symptoms even though there is less
likelihood of brain tissue damage. There may be constant headache,
dizziness, etc., for months even though the patient was merely
stunned at the time of the accident. Thus, it should be re-empha-
sized that, except for prolonged coma, the duration of unconscious-
ness does not determine the presence or absence of troublesome
symptoms in the post-concussive state.
Chronic Brain Syndrome
Up to this point, we have described some of the more important
acute brain syndromes associated with traumatic injuries. By way
of contrast, chronic brain syndromes are distinguished from acute
brain syndromes in that the former may be related to permanent
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brain damage and are usually considered irreversible. A brain dis-
order which appears reversible, i.e., acute, in the early stages may
prove later to have left permanent damage. If so, it will be a per-
sistent organic brain disorder which is then diagnosed as "chronic."
For example, the post-concussion syndrome described above as an
acute pattern of symptoms could also be considered chronic if the
symptoms persist beyond six months or a year.
In addition to the injury-produced, irreversible symptoms of dis-
orientation, faulty memory, impairment of intellectual functions, loss
of interest, etc., chronic brain syndromes may also be accompanied
by either psychotic, neurotic, or behavioral reactions.
Secondary Traumatic Mental Disorders
Secondary traumatic mental disorders involve those patterns of
mental, emotional and behavioral symptoms which are related to the
patient's involvement in a traumatic accident but which are not di-
rectly referable to demonstrable organic pathology. Included here
will be traumatic neuroses (often called "terror neuroses"), ego shock
and mental anguish, hysteria, malingery and simulation, functional
overlay and compensation neurosis.
According to prevailing opinion, the various neurotic reactions fol-
lowing trauma are regarded as "secondary," that is, they were pre-
cipitated by a physical injury to the head or body. Thus, panic reac-
tions following an injury are likened to "terror reactions," such as are
experienced in sudden major catastrophes like earthquakes or explo-
sions. This is a relatively new concept deriving from work with the
military forces during World War II. Those concepts developed
from military studies were carried over to civilian problems of a like
nature.
Abram Kardiner, a psychoanalyst, studied "shell shock" cases after
World War I, extending his work to World War II cases of "combat
fatigue." In both groups he found neuroses to occur in response to a
sudden threat to ego integrity, through shelling or aerial attacks. The
acute-phase symptoms suffered by soldiers under bombardment in-
cluded all those reactions commonly associated with panic: tachy-
cardia, palpitation, precordial discomfort, nausea, diarrhea, desire to
urinate, dyspnea and a feeling of choking or suffocation. The pa-
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tient's pupils were dilated and his face flushed. He perspired exces-
sively and suffered disagreeable sensations, tremulousness, dizziness
and often a sense of weakness and of impending death. Most of
these symptoms reflected marked changes occurring in the autonomic
nervous system secondary to acute anxiety.4
The fact that these symptoms added up to the same manifesta-
tions of anxiety which are a basic feature in every neurosis led many
authors to consider "traumatic neurosis" as similar to hysteric, ob-
sessional, phobic or compulsive neuroses found among persons not
subjected to injury. In other words, the reactions spelled "neuro-
sis," whether or not they were connected with wartime conditions
or trauma. This rather rigid view will be modified here. For the
purposes of this article, the nervous conditions encountered in civil
practice after injury will be considered to stand on their own, so to
speak, as traumatic conditions-the proximate emotional results of
injury to the head or body.
"Terror" or Traumatic Neurosis
Many neurologists and psychiatrists disbelieve in the "traumatic
neurosis" as an entity. Indeed, the American Psychiatric Association
Official Diagnostic Manual (1968) does not even include this diag-
nosis. However, a psychiatric glossary published by that organiza-
tion does define it as follows:
The term (traumatic neurosis) encompasses combat, occupational and compensation
neuroses. These are neurotic reactions that have been attributed to or follow a situ-
ational traumatic event, or series of events. Usually the event has some specific and
symbolic emotional significance for the patient. The neurosis may be reinforced by
secondary gain.5
Early views of the mental effects of trauma to the nervous system
reach back to Erichsen, a neurologist, who in 1875 described the
"Syndrome of Spinal Concussion." This pattern of symptoms, later
known as Erichsen's Disease, was characterized by nervousness after
trauma without signs of actual injury. Erichsen felt the condition
was due to molecular changes in the central nervous system. S.V.
Clevenger, an authority on nervous and mental diseases, (circa
1889) supported the existence of this syndrome, but Erichsen's Dis-
4. KARDINER, THE TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS OF WAR (1941).
5. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSN., A PsYCRiATRIC GLOSSARY (3rd ed. 1969).
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ease was not believed by the courts and its existence was doubted for
many years. Usually such cases were ascribed to hysteria or ma-
lingery.
There still persists a suspicion of malingery by attorneys, juries,
and courts when faced with nervous conditions following trauma.
Furthermore, some physicians still equate traumatic neurosis with
hysteria. This bias partially rests on the earlier notion that hysteria
reflected an implication of effeminacy among male patients. It was
not until the 1870's that Charcot in France and Beard in America
recognized that hysteria could occur among men as well as women.
The term "traumatic neurosis" was introduced by Oppenheim in
Germany in 1889.
For some years the implication was prevalent that neurasthenia
(nerve weakness) lay behind post-traumatic conditions. It was
chiefly modified through the body-mind approach of Paul Schilder
who showed how the body-image, the picture of our bodies by which
we unconsciously view ourselves, is altered at the time of an injury
to the head. 6 All persons invest the head and nervous system with
considerable emotion. Therefore, any injury to the head disrupts the
unity of our body-image giving rise to fear, panic and anxiety, hence
the frequency of hypochondriacal symptoms in post-traumatic cases.
Beyond that, Schilder pointed out that a feeling of "social injustice"
arises which invades the mind of the patient, tending to intensify the
symptoms caused by an accident. He feels that he has been unfairly
singled out and asks, "Why me?"
Concepts relating to the psychology of head injuries rose in sig-
nificance with the increasing frequency of automobile accidents in
this country and combat experiences in World War II. By the late
1930's, it was agreed by most experts that "post-traumatic concus-
sion," or "post-traumatic neurosis," constituted a valid medical con-
dition. For example, in 1939, Walter Schaller, an experienced neu-
rologist, lumped all cases of head-injury sequelae under the phrase
"post-traumatic concussion" so as "to distinguish traumatic enceph-
alopathy, concussive neurosis, and post-traumatic concussion from
post-traumatic psychoneurosis." He reasoned that the "concussive
6. Schilder, Psychic Disturbances After Head Injury, 91 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
155 (1934).
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state" (now called post-concussive syndrome) was due to small, pe-
techial hemorrhages from capillaries in the brain tissues, found in
the cerebral white matter and mid-brain, whereas the "post-traumatic
neurosis" showed no organic findings.
7
These considerations brought into view the purely psychological or
personality make-up of the injured person. It became important
whether an injury might "light up" or aggravate certain psychological
reactions in the patient based on an unstable or "neurotic" back-
ground. Putting the situation in legal terms, Smith and Solomon
asked, "Assuming there was an impact produced by the defendant,
to what extent shall the law protect the idiosyncratic or excessively
vulnerable person in allowing him damages?"
8
The psychology of traumatic neurosis can be explained as the de-
fenses of the ego combating the psychological effects of injury. The
ego is conceived of as the executive organ of the mind; it receives
impressions, coordinates and directs them. One of the ego's impor-
tant tasks is to control emotional excitation. In traumatic neurosis,
this control is deficient or weakened, resulting in emotional instability
and anxiety expressed through physical symptoms, such as muscular
tremors, and emotional ones, such as phobias.
In traumatic neurosis, the ego is hurt or shocked by the trauma,
or the ego interprets the accident to be the threat of total annihilation.
Instead of repressing or blocking off one group of functions, which
might result, for example, in blindness or paralysis of one arm, the
ego loses its power to control its integrative functions and panic en-
sues.
The blow or shock to the ego which results in disturbed control
does not necessarily bear any relation to the degree of actual injury sus-
tained. The injuring force can be directly applied to any part of the
body or it can be distant from the patient, as in a blast accident. In
any event, the ego's efforts to overcome the shock, i.e., to regain mas-
tery of this threat to its existence, determines some of the clinical fea-
tures of the patient's neurosis. Thus, obsessive preoccupation with
the accident, nightmares repeating the accident (sometimes in dis-
7. Schaller, After Effects of Head Trauma, 113 A.M.A. 1779 (1939).
8. Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neurosis in Court, 21 ANNALS OF INT. MED.
367, 374 (1944).
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torted form), intense insecurity, dizziness, loss of confidence and
poor concentration represent the ineffectivness of the ego in con-
trolling emotional excitation. As the ego becomes stronger, or as the
traumatic event recedes in time, the obsessional preoccupation with the
accident, the phobias against driving and the numerous complaints
become less intense.
There are other relevant psychological aspects of traumatic neu-
rosis that also require comment. The patient with traumatic neu-
rosis spreads his feelings beyond his body to the environment. Thus,
his symptoms are colored by his attitude toward doctors, insurance
carriers, employers and society in general. The patient often projects
his hostility to the driver of the vehicle which injured him or to the
insurance company behind the negligent driver. Accompanying this
hostility (which may occasionally be well-founded) is a dependence
on the physician or lawyer handling his case. The traumatic patient
is either cloying and insistent, or belligerent and disgusted. He ad-
dresses himself to the community because of his prolonged symp-
toms, making it clear that he is suffering through no fault of his own.
One result of these feelings is that the patient represses knowledge
of his own negligence in the accident, thus requiring careful sifting
of facts by the attorney or medical expert during the exploratory in-
terview.
These social extensions of psychological problems within the trau-
matized patient require careful consideration when judging the causa-
tion or precipitation of the neurosis. Such social extensions readily
give rise to the notion that the patient is a fake, is malingering, or is
interested only in monetary gain.
There is also the important question of the effect of the case's
settlement on the traumatic neurosis or post-concussive state. The
patient's various hostilities and dependence reactions alluded to above
may make the patient seem more "greenback" minded during the
pre-trial and trial period than he actually is. However, experience
has shown that the persistence of symptoms has more to do with the
underlying pathology than the amount of money received. The at-
torney must remember that he is dealing with a client whose psyche
has been injured to a greater or lesser extent, a psyche which still
has to deal with the problems of life with a less-intact ego and with
fewer mental resources than were originally present.
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Hysteria, Malingery, and Simulation
Dramatic reactions after trauma, either as neurosis or psychosis,
raise the question of malingery and hysteria. This is a murky area
for the reason that historically, medical examiners have been partial to
finding malingery and/or hysteria where the results of trauma were
not in accordance with strict anatomical expectations. If a doctor
found "no physical evidence" of disease, he labeled the symptoms
"hysteric" or "malingered." A negative attitude on the part of exam-
iners often determined the diagnosis. This negative attitude be-
longed to the era when neurologists handled cases now belonging in
the realm of psychiatry. Thus Strauss and Savitsky, in a pioneer
study of head trauma, (1934) commented on earlier attitudes, "The
medical literature on the neurosis following trauma is tainted by a
polemical undercurrent and an unwarranted hostility and antagonism
toward the neurotic."9 This referred to the day when drastic methods
were used to rule out malingery, such as allowing a blind man to
walk into a wall to test whether he was feigning blindness. Although
this rigid attitude has softened since that time, still the "mind set" of
the person making the examination is almost as influential in deter-
mining malingery as is his analysis of the symptoms presented. The
defendant or his agents will wish to prove malingery in neurotic
symptoms; the plaintiff or his agents wish to demonstrate that the
symptoms are valid. In the absence of objective signs, the psycho-
logical "set" of the examiner is obviously significant.
A distinction exists between hysteria and malingery: Hysteria
represents a pathological process of the mind wherein painful or un-
acceptable ideas and emotions are excluded from consciousness. In
hysteria, an emotionally charged idea is split off from consciousness
and converted into a physical symptom, hence the term "conversion
hysteria." Examples of this mechanism, which is unknown to the
patient, are blindness (to shut out a painful or distressing sight),
paralysis (to make use of an arm or leg impossible), and staggering
gait (without organic cerebral injury). It must be emphasized that
in cases of functional loss of a part of the body, the patient does not
consciously cause the symptom; it operates beyond his awareness
through the unconscious mechanism of repression.
9. Strauss & Savitsky, The Sequelae of Head Injury, 91 AMER. J. OF PSY-
cinATmIc 189 (1934).
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In malingery, a symptom is feigned or simulated. Thus, a ma-
lingering patient will act confused, mix up his statements to indicate
poor comprehension, or will hold an arm in a bizarre manner to in-
dicate paralysis. To the experienced observer, malingered symptoms
tend to appear childish and exaggerated, even contrived. A ma-
lingered symptom then is a studied attempt to mimic the condition
claimed.
Some competent authorities feel that there is an element of simula-
tion in every neurosis. Thus, Dr. Schaller makes the point:
Every post-traumatic neurosis is not malingery but a sub-conscious simulator . . .
Every hysteric is a simulator [representing] a milder implication of motive and con-
duct [than found in] the malingerer.10
It is to be noted that Dr. Schaller presented this view in 1929.
Since then, a more moderate approach has been taken. In his classi-
cal text Noyes writes:
Some hysterical phenomena are on the borderline between psychoneurotic reactions
and simulation and therefore come close to malingering. Just where, as to aware-
ness, the line between simulation and hysteria should be drawn is therefore often
arbitrary. 1 '
Examination of the dynamics of simulation and neurosis leads to
an understanding of the underlying emotional process. Malingery is
the first step in denial of a reality the patient (or criminal offender)
is unwilling to face. Indeed, denial is the first line of defense in
any human action for which the perpetrator wishes to shed blame.
After denial comes lying in words or behavior through minimizing
the truth or exaggerating some aspects of it. The next stage is the
concrete assumption of this denial through a bodily disorder-paral-
ysis or other dysfunction-commonly called malingery. Later, this
assumption of a malfunctioning organ can be hardened into a fixed
neurotic symptom, thus betraying the subtle movement from denial
to repression through the unconscious processes of the human ego.
The following case, while just outside the limits of malingery,
still illustrates the mental mechanisms discussed above:
Clinical Case #7. The patient, born in Virginia, was able to write and read to a
limited degree. His Army experience lasted only six months, most of this time
being spent under medical observation for "stomach trouble."
In March, 1960, the patient was injured while a passenger in a bus involved in
10. Supra note 7.
11. NOYES, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 458 (4th ed. 1955).
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a rear-end collision. He immediately felt pain in the neck posteriorly radiating down
the back to the left leg. He was not unconscious, being able to walk to
the ambulance and talk to the officer and driver. Examination at the hospital re-
vealed contusion of the neck and head, the anterior chest and low back.
Subsequently, during the next six years, the patient was treated many times by
physicians with no improvement of his symptoms. Finally, in January, 1966, he
was diagnosed as having a borderline schizophrenia with neurasthenic and conversion
manifestations precipitated and increased by the accident of 1960.
The patient complained of pain in the neck and back of head, aches along the
spine radiating to the left buttock, thigh and calf, aches in both shoulders, pains
across the chest, numbness of the hands, insomnia due to pain, general discomfort
and a feeling that his "life was just messed up." He acknowledged that he was dis-
traught and upset, at times agitated, by his lack of improvement.
Neurological examination was entirely negative. The mental examination re-
vealed an attitude consistent with his condition, lack of improvement and his unhap-
piness because of the "ache in the center of his back."
Reconstruction of this patient's mental condition while in the Army points
towards a neurotic condition, most probably conversion hysteria. In any event he
had made an adequate adjustment until the injury of March, 1960.
The main problem here was the conversion hysteria following a whiplash and
lumbosacral sprain. The excellent muscle tone and absence of spasm in the back,
neck and shoulder muscles preclude a continuing myositis. The whiplash effects
were long since absent. The deep resentment at his fate, characteristic of those
injured "in the rear" (as this patient himself pointed out), accentuated the basic
hysteria present. It was not a conscious malingery.
The more usual cases of malingery feature a bald demonstration
of neurological dysfunction which is contrary to anatomical possi-
bility. Thus, a patient may indicate he cannot move one finger but
is able to move the others which are served by the same nerve or
muscle. Or, he may claim loss of sensation which is patently im-
possible in view of the anatomical nerve supply. A common type of
malingery (less often seen nowadays than in the past) is the epileptic
"fit." Here, the patient flails one arm, or jerks a part of his body
entirely unlike the true epileptic seizure which starts with a clonic
spasm of both arms and legs, then advances to tonic jerks which are
rhythmic and roughly symmetrical while the patient is totally uncon-
scious. In recent years, this type of gross malingery has become
uncommon partly because of the spread of medical information
among the general population.
Functional Overlay
A frequent addition made to a diagnosis in a medical report is
that of "functional overlay," a phrase designed to indicate excessive
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complaints over a relatively minor physical finding. The phrase im-
plies that the patient has let his symptoms overwhelm him, permitting
them to assume larger proportions than would the medical examiner
experienced with such conditions.
In contrast to hysteria and malingery (or simulation) where no
pathological condition exists at all, functional overlay indicates there
is also some evidence of disturbance in the tissues, perhaps evidence
of a muscle spasm, tenderness of a bone or joint, or nioderate in-
volvement of a nerve. Technically, the term, "functional overlay,"
covers the over-valuation of a symptom; it lies in a borderline area
between simulation, hysteria and pre-occupation with subjective com-
plaints.
The psychology of over-valuation of a symptom is perilously close
to that of a normal reaction, hence it is difficult to establish its
compensability. One has to look carefully into the personality and
psychological background of the plaintiff in a personal injury case
where the examiners claim he has over-valued his symptom. In a
sense, all persons over-value their bodies and its deficiencies. Thus,
if a person gets a foreign body in the eye, the disabled eye is all-
engrossing to the sufferer. So too, an accident victim is automatically
forced to devote his complete attention to his injuries until they re-
duce in intensity. When this reduction does not occur, one can
speak of an over-valued complaint. The persistence of this concern
may be related to the patient's covert feelings of resentment, frustra-
tion at being unable to get rid of his disability (as in many low back
pain cases), or feelings of humiliation that he was even injured at all.
This pattern comes to the fore with particular persistence in rear-
end collision cases. Here, the patient's paranoid sensitivity is mo-
bilized, especially if the accident occurred without warning. Being
attacked from the back (as in case #7) stimulates feelings of be-
trayal, of undue hurt and unfairness. Where the patient's fears per-
sist far beyond the time anticipated that the post-concussive or whip-
lash symptoms would usually clear up, we are dealing with an over-
valued complaint, or even an activation of an inferiority or other
neurotic state, rather than malingery. In fact, most of the phobic
reactions following trauma to the head, especially those incurred in
automobile accidents, dip into the psychology of the victim, reacti-
vating old fears and anxieties ordinarily hidden from consciousness.
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The psychological assault associated with an accidental injury can-
not be divorced from the patient's basic fears-which we all share
-of unexpected and unanticipated blows, with their implied threat
of destruction and death. Indeed, the total thrust of neurosis after
trauma has to do with fears of annihilation, whether the fears are
controlled to some degree or not. This is the reason for the frequent
catastrophic or anxiety dreams which accident victims experience.
The dream functions as a safety valve to gradually channel off the
fears of destruction unloosed by the trauma itself.
The following case demonstrates some of these psychological ele-
ments:
Clinical Case #8. A woman of 35, while stopped at a traffic light, was struck
from behind by a truck. She was unaware of the impending collision until it hap-
pened. The patient suffered from a cranio-cervical syndrome (whiplash) and a
mild secondary concussion. Several months later, as the muscle pains, stiffness
of the neck, headache, blurred vision and other complaints gradually cleared up, she
began to experience severe anxiety attacks when riding in a car. Her particular
fear of being struck in the rear of the car, forced her to sit (as passenger) facing
the driver so that she could observe both the road before and behind the car.
Her phobia became so disturbing that she was unable to ride in a car without
sedation and even then with great difficulty.
Careful study of the case revealed that she had a sexual experience early in life
in which an attack of rape had resulted in an illegitimate child. There were some
threats of anal intercourse at the time. The "rear-end" collision had reactivated
her earlier trauma of attack "from the rear."
The patient's psychological reaction to being struck in a rear-end
collision does not necessarily dip into the psyco-sexual areas of the
patient's mind. More usually, the shock of the impact and its seem-
ing wantonness, as in the case of alcoholic drivers unable to stop
their vehicles, induces a strong reaction of anger in the victim.
As this reaction fades, a sense of humiliation develops which often,
especially in female victims, colors the post-traumatic neurosis symp-
toms.
Compensation Neurosis
The problem of "compensation neurosis," or "greenback neuro-
sis" as it is sometimes facetiously called by defense attorneys, merges
with the reactions discussed above when viewed from a psychological
standpoint. In these cases, the injuries can be substantial, or they
may be trivial; even so, some defendants are loud in their claims for
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financial restitution or even retribution. Still, one cannot say that
the financial settlement is their only goal. Nor is it true that sudden
cures occur in most cases after a financial settlement has been
reached. Frequently, after a court settlement is reached the com-
plaints centering around a post-concussion syndrome or a traumatic
neurotic condition persist for years.
It is necessary to point out that this view is not universally held
among medical experts. Thus, one competent psychiatrist feels,
".. . it is almost impossible to offer meaningful psychotherapy to a
patient suffering from compulsion neurosis prior to settlement of liti-
gation.' 1 2 In spite of this attitude held by some, the question arises
whether it is correct to say that "compensation neurosis" exists at all
as a clinical entity. At best, the condition is a neurosis with strong
dependency features and, at worst, an insurance company's slogan.
The situation behind "compensation neurosis" is compounded with
complaints from the injury, resentment, and unconscious dependency
elements, as was described above under traumatic neurosis. The
psychological attitude toward the "company" on the part of the in-
jured client is crucial. As some authors put it, " . . . the injured
patient relates to the Company as a gigantic parent figure at whose
hands she could not tolerate frustration .... "11 To return to the
thesis that financial settlement does not always settle the patient's
problems, one should consider accidents involving older persons
where the likelihood of continuing in gainful occupation or in en-
joying their "retirement" without disability or disabling symptoms is
markedly reduced by the injury.
In this connection, comment should be made on the so-called
"secondary gain" from illness. This is a recognized neurotic reaction
in which the symptoms suffered convey the advantages of being cared
for, "babied," freed from responsibility, or thrust into the center of
attention, by virtue of the medical condition. Every person can be
shown to experience this secondary gain, usually in minute degree,
i.e., every patient from any cause wishes to be regarded as an unfor-
tunate victim of fate, thus extracting sympathy from his or her care-
takers, medical attendants and family. In head injury cases, this
12. Miller, The Compensation Neurosis, 4 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE 159 (1959).
13. Tourkow & Tattan, Some Problems Confronting the Psychiatrist and Psy-
chologist in Compensation Work, 4 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE 292 (1959).
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tendency is even stronger because of the over-valuation of the head
(the governing intellect) and because (and this is the important fac-
tor) the injury was inflicted by another person rather than by na-
ture, one's own neglect, poor heredity or an epidemic of some febrile
illness.
The secondary gain in head injury patients has the function of
holding society to blame, in addition to the person or equipment that
caused the blow; the patient considers himself entirely without fault.
This attitude, while partly a conscious one, invades the psychology
of the plaintiff to the point where all symptoms and disabilities are
intensified. This is particularly true when the injury occurs on a
common carrier such as a train, bus or plane. In such cases the
"attacker" is an impersonal corporation operating the vehicle through
the engineer, driver or pilot. The reaction of anger cannot be easily
fixed on one person, hence it spreads from the vehicle involved in the
accident to the corporation behind it. The lack of specific goals for
feelings of retaliation force themselves back onto the ego of the vic-
tim, a mental mechanism technically called "introjection," wherein
anger floods the victim, adding to the intensity of the actual physical
symptoms.
The secondary gain in such cases then revolves around the victim's
hostile feelings towards the corporation behind the common carrier.
These feelings simultaneously bolster the symptoms and increase the
need to make the company pay for pain, disability and the indignity
for which the victim is blameless. The following is an example of this
mechanism:
Clinical Case #9. The patient, a New York woman on vacation in California,
was riding on a Greyhound Bus enroute to Los Angeles in 1962. A truck struck
the bus, shearing off the front section, and killing two passengers sitting just in
front of the patient. She was a woman of fifty, previously well-integrated, intelli-
gent and physically and mentally well. She was apparently unconscious for an unde-
termined period. Examinations by several physicians and studies in several hos-
pitals resulted in diagnoses of brain concussion, lacerations and contusions, and
severe cervical sprain (whiplash). The patient's complaints were numerous-pain
in temples, numbness and pain in head and neck, head noises, nausea, insomnia,
nervous and irritable, concentration difficulty, fatigue, dizziness, poor memory,
photophobia, and hyperacusis.
Examination by competent neurologists agreed on the traumatic neurosis, brain
concussion and whiplash. A later examiner, six months after the accident, agreed
with the diagnosis of traumatic neurosis. The patient was given intensive treatment
with medications and physical therapy for about two years.
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Two and a half years later her pain and discomfort worsened. She was troubled
with disturbed "balance in hands," muscle jerks at night, startle reactions and night-
mares (once and twice a month), and return of "repressed" anger against the bus
company. She described her condition as feeling "draggy, with no initiative." She
was in constant discomfort. She summed it up by saying "I live in a world,
scared of everything." At the last examination, three years after the accident,
there was some improvement in neck distress, but persistence of many symptoms.
Mental complaints such as tension, shakiness, lack of confidence, impatience, and
forgetfulness remained as before, especially since the patient discovered she had
been "tailed" and photographed by the Pinkerton Agency, for the Greyhound Bus
Company.
Litigation was prolonged, necessitating the patient's travelling from the East to the
West Coast on several occasions. Her nervous state improved very little after a
judgment in her favor at the trial. Four years after the accident she showed a
tense, nervous, and anxious state, classical for post-concussive symptoms even down
to the decreased sexual libido, memory decrease, dizziness, photophobia, insomnia,
etc. The patient's complaints of changed personality with decreased initiative, lack
of confidence, impaired social adjustment, draggy feelings and constant preoccupa-
tion with symptoms all appeared valid.
Ego Shock and Recoverable Mental Anguish
The problem of anxiety and panic reactions arising under the um-
brella of secondary traumatic mental disorders (hysteria or traumatic
neurosis) raises the question of compensability of mental anguish suf-
fered by the victim in a negligence case. Many courts have pre-
viously refused to allow recovery where the physical consequences
complained of resulted solely from the internal operation of mental
and emotional stresses, unless there was, coincident in time and
place with the stress-producing event, some physical impact which
also resulted directly from defendant's negligence. Although this
rule has been rejected by a large number of courts, it is still in force
in many jurisdictions.
For example, some states continue to follow the doctrine of
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,14 which denied recovery for mental distress
without physical contact. In that case, the court expressed the con-
cern that claims for mental distress were too easily faked to permit
compensation.
In Mitchell, the plantiff was standing in a cross-walk waiting to
board defendant's horse-drawn streetcar. As the team attached to
the car drew near, they suddenly veered to the right so that they
14. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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came close to plaintiff, although not touching her. When the horses
stopped, plaintiff was left standing between the horses' heads. She
testified that from the fright and excitement caused by the approach
and proximity of the team she became unconscious, later suffering
a miscarriage and consequent illness.
In denying recovery, the court stated:
Assuming that the evidence tended to show that the defendant's servant was negligent
in the management of the car and horses, and that the plaintiff was free from
contributory negligence, the single question presented is whether the plaintiff is
entitled to recover for the defendant's negligence which occasioned her fright and
alarm, and resulted in the injuries already mentioned . . . . Assuming that fright
cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvious that no recovery can be
had for injuries resulting therefrom. That the result may be nervous disease, blind-
ness, insanity, or even a miscarriage, in no way changes the principle . . . If the
right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it would naturally
result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained of may be
easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere con-
jecture or speculation.' 5
A more recent Pennsylvania case, Bosley v. Andrews,' also denied
recovery to a plaintiff who suffered a heart attack from fright caused
by defendant's bull charging at him. The court held that there can
be no recovery of damages for injuries resulting from fright or ner-
vous shock or mental or emotional disturbances or distress, unless
they are accompanied by physical injury or physical impact.17
The ridiculous extremes to which courts which followed the "im-
pact rule" were put in justifying recovery for mental suffering and
anguish is well illustrated in Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage.'s In
this case, the court held that a valid cause of action was stated by
plaintiff, an unmarried woman, who, while a guest at defendant's
circus, suffered embarrassment, mortification, and mental pain and
suffering when one of the performing horses was backed toward her
and evacuated his bowel in her lap to the great amusement of the
surrounding crowd.
It is probably the accepted rule in a majority of jurisdictions that
where definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result
of emotional stress wrongfully caused by defendant, he may be held
15. Id. at 109, 110, 45 N.E. at 354.
16. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
17. Id.
18. 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928).
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liable for such consequences notwithstanding the absence of any
physical impact on the plaintiff at the time of the mental shock.
The Restatement of Torts provides:
LIf the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to protect
another from fright or other emotional disturbance which the actor should recognize
as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm results
solely through the internal operation of the fright or other emotional disturbance does
not protect the actor from liability, [and] if the actor's conduct is negligent as
creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by
subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance,
the fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or other
emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.' 9
The rule allowing recovery for the physical consequences of mental
suffering without actual impact has been subjected, in some cases, to
the limitation that there can be no recovery except by those who were
within the area of physical risk from defendant's negligent act. For
example, in Orlo v. Connecticut Co.,20 the court said a jury question
was presented where it was shown that defendant's electric wire neg-
ligently dropped on a car in which plaintiff, a passenger, sat for sev-
eral minutes with wires flashing and hissing around the car. Al-
though there were no bums or marks on his body, plaintiff suffered
severe nervous shock and severe fright causing him to tremble and
shake for about a month and requiring his hospitalization for ag-
gravation of certain pre-existing physical disabilities.
This "area of physical risk" or "zone of danger" rule has probably
had its greatest prominence in those cases where recovery for shock
or mental anguish is sought by a plaintiff who feared or witnessed
actual or threatened harm to another person. However, the courts
appear to be expanding the circumstances and conditions for grant-
ing recovery for emotional trauma to witnesses of distressing events,
even though they were personally not in danger.
The furthest move so far in that direction came from the California
Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg.21  In this case, a mother saw her
infant daughter killed by a car as she crossed an intersection and
she brought suit for her own emotional trauma at witnessing the acci-
dent. The lower court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
19. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 436 (1934).
20. 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941).
21. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
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suit on the basis that under prior decisions no cause of action is
stated unless a plaintiff's shock has resulted from fear for his own
safety. In reversing this decision, the California court stated that the
mother's great physical and mental shock and suffering at witnessing
this traumatic event was a proper subject for damages since her fear,
shock, etc. should have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant
when his negligence was directed to a third person.
The court also set down three factors trial courts should take into
account to determine whether a defendant owed a duty to or should
reasonably foresee emotional injury to a witness of an injury to a third
person:
(1) whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident,
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it; (2)
whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon
plaintiff from his sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence; and (3) whether plaintiff and the victim were closely
related, as contrasted with a distant relationship or none at all. In
light of these factors, the trial court would then determine whether
the accident and emotional harm to witnesses was reasonably fore-
seeable.
Compensable Emotional Disturbance in Industrial Accidents
Workmen's compensation awards for neurological or psychological
difficulties resulting from job-related injuries parallel those for non-
industrial accidents. The legal difference, of course, is that work-
men's compensation statutes reject the common law defenses of con-
tributory negligence, fellow-servant rule, and assumption of the risk,
in favor of a general theory of employer's liability without fault.
In recent years, the area of industrial accidents has been extended
from the obvious injuries of arms, legs, head and sense organs to the
more obscure psychiatric and psychological difficulties, or as they
were earlier referred to by the courts, "intangible impairments."
There appear to be two main types of "intangible impairments"
cases: one involves nervous (neurotic or psychotic) symptoms fol-
lowing actual injuries to the head or any other part of the body; the
other includes mental disorders in the absence of impact.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
In Ladner v. Higgins, Inc.,22 plaintiff fell about eight feet from a
scaffold which in turn struck him on the shoulder. Although there
was no permanent bone pathology, the court held the plaintiff was
unable to work because of a disabling traumatic neurosis and af-
firmed the award.
However, in Miller Rasmussen Ice and Coal v. Industrial Commis-
sion,2" a Wisconsin court set aside a workmen's compensation award
because the plaintiff's physical injury was so slight and his pre-exist-
ing neurotic condition was so obvious.
The second group of compensation cases involves no physical im-
pact, but rather considers the psychic stress of plaintiff's ordinary
work as the proximate cause of his resulting nervous condition. The
case of Burlington Mills v. Hagood,24 voided the impact rule in com-
pensating for a traumatic neurosis. In that case, plaintiff saw a flash
of a short-circuited electric motor fifteen feet away and fainted, al-
though a co-worker caught her before she fell. Afterwards, she was
unable to work because of a traumatic neurosis. The court said,
We are fully aware that in tort actions we have followed the common-law rule that
there can be no recovery for mental anguish unaccompanied by physical injury, and
of the reasons for the rule. The rules of the common-law for tort actions, however,
do not apply to cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, the proceeding is not one for damage for a wrong done,
but to obtain compensation for a loss sustained by reason of disability ....
In the instant case, the disability of Mrs. Hagood was occasioned by an injury
which may be fairly traced to a risk which arose out of and in the course
of her employment. There was a direct causal relation between the electric flash
and the irritated condition of her nervous system. 25
The farthest extention of the doctrine permitting recovery for non-
impact-related mental illness caused by stress or emotional pressure
in a work situation can be found in Carter v. General Motors.26  In
this case the plaintiff, who had been hospitalized on previous occa-
sions, worked on an assembly line job to which he could not
adapt. If he followed regular factory procedure in removing burrs
from wheel assemblies one at a time, he fell behind the normal pace
of the line and was criticized. If he attempted to work on two wheels
22. 71 So. 2d 242 (Ct. App. La. 1954).
23. 263 Wis. 538, 57 N.W.2d 736 (1953).
24. 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941).
25. Id. at 210-11, 13 S.E.2d at 293.
26. 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
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at once, he sometimes mixed them up and was again criticized-a
classic "double bind" situation. After twelve days of this dilemma,
plaintiff suffered an emotional collapse (he was diagnosed as schizo-
phrenic, paranoid type), and was hospitalized for one month. Al-
though ruling out a permanent disability award, the court granted
plaintiff compensation for his temporary emotional disablement
plus medical and hospital care.
Some concern has been expressed that compensation awards may
soon become the rule for any employee who suffers some psycholog-
ical difficulties from work pressures even though the pre-morbid per-
sonality is disposed toward emotional disorder. Arguably, the avail-
ability of compensation may increase the rate of psychoneurotic
reactions. As we have seen above, however, many different external
and internal factors may precipitate a psychoneurosis. Little psy-
chiatric evidence is available, however to show whether or not the
promise of financial gain can provide a neurosis-producing motive,
although external benefits such as sympathy, attention or compensa-
tion may unconsciously prolong the reaction or heighten its intens-
ity. 27 Two basic reasons are presented by psychiatrists to explain
the significance of such factors. First, the external benefits may help
the individual to adapt to his psychoneurotic reaction. The receipt
of compensation may satisfy dependency or aggressive needs. It
may also reduce financial worries resulting from the psychoneurotic
reaction, thus reinforcing the effectiveness of the reaction as a con-
flict-reducing device. Second, many psychiatrists accept the view
that such external benefits may constitute advantages which are in-
dependent of those associated with the release of psychic tension. A
desire to retain these bonuses may unconsciously motivate the indi-
vidual to prolong the psychoneurotic reaction once it has arisen.
CONCLUSION
Because of the many possible psychological ramifications of trau-
matic injuries, the attorney handling a personal injury case should
be sure that a thorough review is made of the emotional, neurological
and psychiatric difficulties his client is experiencing. The viewpoint
of the examiner should be objective and should consider the deeper
emotional consequences of the traumatic event.
27. ALEXANDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 212 (1948).
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It is also important to remember that even though objective physi-
cal and neurological signs are absent, this does not mean the accident
victim is not suffering from a genuine psychiatric disability. The lit-
erature is replete with examples of patients whose emotional wounds
continue to plague them long after their physical injuries have or
should have healed. A personal injury client may require psychiatric
treatment in addition to strictly medical care in order to cope with
the emotional difficulties arising from his traumatic accident and be-
cause of the influence of psychiatric problems on physical well-being.
The attorney, as well as the medical examiner, should treat each
case on an individual basis. Every client has his own particular ego
strengths, personal weaknesses, cultural background, family situation
and psychological resources with which to meet his problems. The
symptoms of different persons may sound similar, but justice (and
medicine) can be satisfied by nothing less than a thorough study and
evaluation of each individual case.
